Abstract
Only a small fraction of firms that hire disadvantaged workers claim the federal subsidies for which they qualify, namely, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) and Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit (WtW). Subsidy benefits depend partially on job duration, with higher subsidy rates above certain job-duration thresholds. I estimate the relationship between a firm's WOTC/WtW participation and its eligible workers' job durations. Using unique Wisconsin administrative data, I find that workers' subsidy rates (determined by hours worked) have the expected relationship to participation: Firms with a larger fraction of workers exceeding the programs' job-duration thresholds are more likely to claim the WOTC/WtW. I also find no evidence that firms systematically modify the job duration of their workers to maximize subsidy payments.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 916-934 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Economic Inquiry |
Volume | 49 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jul 2011 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Business, Management and Accounting
- Economics and Econometrics