Weak independence and veto power

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

Weak independence (WI) prevents x from socially ranking above y at profile p if y ranks above x at profile p′ and each individual ordering of {x,y} is the same at p as at p′. If f is transitive-valued and satisfies WI and Pareto then someone has veto power.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)183-189
Number of pages7
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume66
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2000

Keywords

  • D71
  • D74
  • Pareto
  • Transitivity
  • Veto
  • Weak IIA

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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