Wages, Talent, and Demand for NCAA Sport After the Alston v. NCAA Antitrust Case

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

From the “landmark” Alston v. NCAA antitrust decision, we examine whether the legally hypothesized fan wage-repugnance effect implies procompetitive benefits in NCAA sports output markets via increased output demand from student-athlete wage restriction. In Alston v. NCAA, the Courts took this benefit as given but failed to recognize the empirically-verified relationship between league talent and fan demand. We assume a legally-hypothesized wage-repugnance line exists and present a theoretical output-demand model functionally dependent upon allocations in a wage-constrained labor-input market. Even given fan repugnance, wage restrictions do not necessarily generate procompetitive benefits. For families of model parameterizations, wage restrictions impose anticompetitive harm.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)169-185
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Sports Economics
Volume25
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2024

Keywords

  • Alston v. NCAA
  • NCAA student-athlete pay
  • amateur sports demand
  • antitrust laws
  • sport antitrust case

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

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