Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasitransitive social choice

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


X is infinite and social preference is quasitransitive. Subset Y of X is sufficient for {x, y} if x and y can be socially ordered with individual preference information over Y alone. If there is an integer β such that every pair of alternatives has a sufficient set with at most β members then for arbitrarily large finite subsets of X there is a rich subdomain of profiles within which a reduction in the amount of veto power must be accompanied by an equal increase in the fraction of pairs that are restricted, in that strict social preference prevails in only one direction.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)31-35
Number of pages5
JournalMathematical social sciences
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2013

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • General Social Sciences
  • General Psychology
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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