Abstract
The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive integer β such that for each pair of alternatives, {a, b}, there exists a set S (a, b) of at most β alternatives such that a and b can be socially ordered on the basis of the profile of preferences restricted to just S (a, b), then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial on a rich sub-domain of profiles.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 415-421 |
Number of pages | 7 |
Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
Volume | 45 |
Issue number | 7-8 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jul 20 2009 |
Keywords
- Chromatic graphs
- Infinite set
- Social welfare function
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Applied Mathematics