Uniformly bounded information and social choice

Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.006

Uniformly bounded information and social choice

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive integer β such that for each pair of alternatives, {a, b}, there exists a set S (a, b) of at most β alternatives such that a and b can be socially ordered on the basis of the profile of preferences restricted to just S (a, b), then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial on a rich sub-domain of profiles.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	415-421
Number of pages	7
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	45
Issue number	7-8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.006
State	Published - Jul 20 2009

Keywords

Chromatic graphs
Infinite set
Social welfare function

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Applied Mathematics

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Campbell, D. E., & Kelly, J. S. (2009). Uniformly bounded information and social choice. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 45(7-8), 415-421. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.006

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