Uniformly bounded information and social choice

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive integer β such that for each pair of alternatives, {a, b}, there exists a set S (a, b) of at most β alternatives such that a and b can be socially ordered on the basis of the profile of preferences restricted to just S (a, b), then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial on a rich sub-domain of profiles.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)415-421
Number of pages7
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume45
Issue number7-8
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 20 2009

Keywords

  • Chromatic graphs
  • Infinite set
  • Social welfare function

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

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