### Abstract

The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive integer β such that for each pair of alternatives, {a, b}, there exists a set S (a, b) of at most β alternatives such that a and b can be socially ordered on the basis of the profile of preferences restricted to just S (a, b), then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial on a rich sub-domain of profiles.

Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 415-421 |

Number of pages | 7 |

Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |

Volume | 45 |

Issue number | 7-8 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Jul 20 2009 |

### Keywords

- Chromatic graphs
- Infinite set
- Social welfare function

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Economics and Econometrics
- Applied Mathematics

## Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Uniformly bounded information and social choice'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

## Cite this

Campbell, D. E., & Kelly, J. S. (2009). Uniformly bounded information and social choice.

*Journal of Mathematical Economics*,*45*(7-8), 415-421. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.006