TY - JOUR

T1 - Uniformly bounded information and social choice

AU - Campbell, Donald E.

AU - Kelly, Jerry S.

N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2009 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2009/7/20

Y1 - 2009/7/20

N2 - The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive integer β such that for each pair of alternatives, {a, b}, there exists a set S (a, b) of at most β alternatives such that a and b can be socially ordered on the basis of the profile of preferences restricted to just S (a, b), then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial on a rich sub-domain of profiles.

AB - The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive integer β such that for each pair of alternatives, {a, b}, there exists a set S (a, b) of at most β alternatives such that a and b can be socially ordered on the basis of the profile of preferences restricted to just S (a, b), then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial on a rich sub-domain of profiles.

KW - Chromatic graphs

KW - Infinite set

KW - Social welfare function

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=67349140342&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=67349140342&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.006

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:67349140342

VL - 45

SP - 415

EP - 421

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

SN - 0304-4068

IS - 7-8

ER -