TY - JOUR
T1 - Uniformly bounded information and social choice
AU - Campbell, Donald E.
AU - Kelly, Jerry S.
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2009 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2009/7/20
Y1 - 2009/7/20
N2 - The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive integer β such that for each pair of alternatives, {a, b}, there exists a set S (a, b) of at most β alternatives such that a and b can be socially ordered on the basis of the profile of preferences restricted to just S (a, b), then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial on a rich sub-domain of profiles.
AB - The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive integer β such that for each pair of alternatives, {a, b}, there exists a set S (a, b) of at most β alternatives such that a and b can be socially ordered on the basis of the profile of preferences restricted to just S (a, b), then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial on a rich sub-domain of profiles.
KW - Chromatic graphs
KW - Infinite set
KW - Social welfare function
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=67349140342&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=67349140342&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.006
DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.006
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:67349140342
VL - 45
SP - 415
EP - 421
JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics
JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics
SN - 0304-4068
IS - 7-8
ER -