TY - GEN
T1 - Truthful routing for wireless hybrid networks
AU - Wang, Yu
AU - Wang, Weizhao
AU - Dahlberg, Teresa A.
PY - 2005
Y1 - 2005
N2 - Wireless hybrid networks combine the characteristics of both cellular and mobile ad hoc networks. In wireless hybrid networks, it is often assumed that each individual mobile node will faithfully follow the prescribed protocols without any deviation. However, these mobile devices, when owned by individual users, will likely do what is the most beneficial to their owners, i.e., act "selfishly". Therefore, an algorithm or protocol intended for selfish wireless devices must be designed. In this paper, we specifically study how to design routing protocols in wireless hybrid networks with selfish nodes. We first present a VCG-based routing protocol for hybrid networks, and show it is truthful but could be expensive. Then we modify the VCG-based routing protocol to make it more efficient for hybrid networks in term of total payment. However, we prove that nodes could lie up their costs in the modified method. Moreover, we propose a novel routing protocol based on first-price path auctions [1], which can achieve a Nash equilibrium with low total payment.
AB - Wireless hybrid networks combine the characteristics of both cellular and mobile ad hoc networks. In wireless hybrid networks, it is often assumed that each individual mobile node will faithfully follow the prescribed protocols without any deviation. However, these mobile devices, when owned by individual users, will likely do what is the most beneficial to their owners, i.e., act "selfishly". Therefore, an algorithm or protocol intended for selfish wireless devices must be designed. In this paper, we specifically study how to design routing protocols in wireless hybrid networks with selfish nodes. We first present a VCG-based routing protocol for hybrid networks, and show it is truthful but could be expensive. Then we modify the VCG-based routing protocol to make it more efficient for hybrid networks in term of total payment. However, we prove that nodes could lie up their costs in the modified method. Moreover, we propose a novel routing protocol based on first-price path auctions [1], which can achieve a Nash equilibrium with low total payment.
KW - Game theory
KW - Non-cooperative computing
KW - Payment
KW - Strategyproof
KW - Truthful routing
KW - Wireless hybrid networks
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33846608276&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33846608276&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2005.1578416
DO - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2005.1578416
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:33846608276
SN - 0780394143
SN - 9780780394148
T3 - GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
SP - 3461
EP - 3465
BT - GLOBECOM'05
T2 - GLOBECOM'05: IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2005
Y2 - 28 November 2005 through 2 December 2005
ER -