Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing

Xiang Zhang, Guoliang Xue, Ruozhou Yu, Dejun Yang, Jian Tang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Entry/PoemConference contribution

165 Scopus citations


With the prosperity of smart devices, crowdsourcing has emerged as a new computing/networking paradigm. Through the crowdsourcing platform, service requesters can buy service from service providers. An important component of crowdsourcing is its incentive mechanism. We study three models of crowdsourcing, which involve cooperation and competition among the service providers. Our simplest model generalizes the well-known user-centric model studied in a recent Mobicom paper. We design an incentive mechanism for each of the three models, and prove that these incentive mechanisms are individually rational, budget-balanced, computationally efficient, and truthful.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2015
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781479983810
StatePublished - Aug 21 2015
Event34th IEEE Annual Conference on Computer Communications and Networks, IEEE INFOCOM 2015 - Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Duration: Apr 26 2015May 1 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
ISSN (Print)0743-166X


Other34th IEEE Annual Conference on Computer Communications and Networks, IEEE INFOCOM 2015
Country/TerritoryHong Kong
CityHong Kong

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Computer Science
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


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