Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing

Xiang Zhang; Guoliang Xue; Ruozhou Yu; Dejun Yang; Jian Tang

doi:10.1109/INFOCOM.2015.7218676

Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing

Xiang Zhang, Guoliang Xue, Ruozhou Yu, Dejun Yang, Jian Tang

Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Entry/Poem › Conference contribution

169 Scopus citations

Abstract

With the prosperity of smart devices, crowdsourcing has emerged as a new computing/networking paradigm. Through the crowdsourcing platform, service requesters can buy service from service providers. An important component of crowdsourcing is its incentive mechanism. We study three models of crowdsourcing, which involve cooperation and competition among the service providers. Our simplest model generalizes the well-known user-centric model studied in a recent Mobicom paper. We design an incentive mechanism for each of the three models, and prove that these incentive mechanisms are individually rational, budget-balanced, computationally efficient, and truthful.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2015
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	2830-2838
Number of pages	9
ISBN (Electronic)	9781479983810
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2015.7218676
State	Published - Aug 21 2015
Event	34th IEEE Annual Conference on Computer Communications and Networks, IEEE INFOCOM 2015 - Hong Kong, Hong Kong Duration: Apr 26 2015 → May 1 2015

Publication series

Name	Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
Volume	26
ISSN (Print)	0743-166X

Other

Other	34th IEEE Annual Conference on Computer Communications and Networks, IEEE INFOCOM 2015
Country/Territory	Hong Kong
City	Hong Kong
Period	4/26/15 → 5/1/15

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Computer Science
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/INFOCOM.2015.7218676

Cite this

Zhang, X, Xue, G, Yu, R, Yang, D & Tang, J 2015, Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing. in 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2015., 7218676, Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM, vol. 26, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 2830-2838, 34th IEEE Annual Conference on Computer Communications and Networks, IEEE INFOCOM 2015, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 4/26/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFOCOM.2015.7218676

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author = "Xiang Zhang and Guoliang Xue and Ruozhou Yu and Dejun Yang and Jian Tang",

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AB - With the prosperity of smart devices, crowdsourcing has emerged as a new computing/networking paradigm. Through the crowdsourcing platform, service requesters can buy service from service providers. An important component of crowdsourcing is its incentive mechanism. We study three models of crowdsourcing, which involve cooperation and competition among the service providers. Our simplest model generalizes the well-known user-centric model studied in a recent Mobicom paper. We design an incentive mechanism for each of the three models, and prove that these incentive mechanisms are individually rational, budget-balanced, computationally efficient, and truthful.

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M3 - Conference contribution

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BT - 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2015

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Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing

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