Abstract
We investigate Arrow's problem for the space of allocations of public goods and the domain of profiles of Euclidean individual preferences. We allow some efficiency to be sacrificed in order to avoid dictatorship, but if independence of irrelevant alternatives and transitivity of social preference remain in force, then there is no social welfare function that permits a significant departure from dictatorship without a substantial sacrifice of efficiency.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-19 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
Volume | 60 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Apr 1996 |
Keywords
- Euclidean preference
- Public goods
- Social welfare function
- Spatial model
- Trade-offs
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics