TY - JOUR
T1 - The Political Psychology of ‘Peace through Democratization’
AU - Kegley, Charles W.
AU - Hermann, Margaret G.
N1 - Funding Information:
This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology at the Universidad de Santiago, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 12-15 July 1994. We would like to thank Jack Levy, Gregory Raymond, Neil Richardson and Stephen Walker for their comments on this earlier version. This project was supported in part by a grant (019-94S) from the United States Institute of Peace. The opinions, findings and conclusions expressed in this study, however, are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace.
PY - 1995/3
Y1 - 1995/3
N2 - Many scholars and policy-makers have pinned their hopes on the expectation that in the post-Cold War world peace will be preserved if the diffusion of democracy continues. This hope is grounded on the demonstrable evidence that historically democracies have rarely, if ever, waged large-scale war to resolve their disputes with one another. Yet explanations as to why this propensity is exhibited have been unsatisfactory, and debate about the causes of ‘the democratic peace’ as well as about the domain to which it applies have not resulted in consensus. Reviewing the empirical findings in this genre of research, this article examines a deviant case — the Reagan Administration's covert military interventions in the 1980s against established governments — to generate propositions about the heretofore neglected influence of democratic leaders' perceptions and beliefs on the linkage between democracy and peace. The implications for subsequent theory-building are probed to suggest how explanations and descriptions of the democratic peace might be improved by taking an expanded view of its preconditions.
AB - Many scholars and policy-makers have pinned their hopes on the expectation that in the post-Cold War world peace will be preserved if the diffusion of democracy continues. This hope is grounded on the demonstrable evidence that historically democracies have rarely, if ever, waged large-scale war to resolve their disputes with one another. Yet explanations as to why this propensity is exhibited have been unsatisfactory, and debate about the causes of ‘the democratic peace’ as well as about the domain to which it applies have not resulted in consensus. Reviewing the empirical findings in this genre of research, this article examines a deviant case — the Reagan Administration's covert military interventions in the 1980s against established governments — to generate propositions about the heretofore neglected influence of democratic leaders' perceptions and beliefs on the linkage between democracy and peace. The implications for subsequent theory-building are probed to suggest how explanations and descriptions of the democratic peace might be improved by taking an expanded view of its preconditions.
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U2 - 10.1177/0010836795030001001
DO - 10.1177/0010836795030001001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84937288861
VL - 30
SP - 5
EP - 30
JO - Cooperation and Conflict
JF - Cooperation and Conflict
SN - 0010-8367
IS - 1
ER -