The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences

Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.026

The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

When the number of alternatives exceeds the smallest prime dividing the number of individuals, all social choice functions satisfying resoluteness, neutrality, and anonymity (RNA rules) sometimes choose alternatives that everyone ranks near the bottom. When the number of individuals is divisible by two or more distinct primes, RNA rules only exist for a small (finite) number of values of the number of alternatives.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	109-111
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	132
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.026
State	Published - Jul 1 2015

Keywords

Anonymity
Frobenius number
Neutrality
Perverse
Resoluteness
Schur's theorem

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.026

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abstract = "When the number of alternatives exceeds the smallest prime dividing the number of individuals, all social choice functions satisfying resoluteness, neutrality, and anonymity (RNA rules) sometimes choose alternatives that everyone ranks near the bottom. When the number of individuals is divisible by two or more distinct primes, RNA rules only exist for a small (finite) number of values of the number of alternatives.",

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AU - Kelly, Jerry S.

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AB - When the number of alternatives exceeds the smallest prime dividing the number of individuals, all social choice functions satisfying resoluteness, neutrality, and anonymity (RNA rules) sometimes choose alternatives that everyone ranks near the bottom. When the number of individuals is divisible by two or more distinct primes, RNA rules only exist for a small (finite) number of values of the number of alternatives.

KW - Anonymity

KW - Frobenius number

KW - Neutrality

KW - Perverse

KW - Resoluteness

KW - Schur's theorem

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The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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