The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

When the number of alternatives exceeds the smallest prime dividing the number of individuals, all social choice functions satisfying resoluteness, neutrality, and anonymity (RNA rules) sometimes choose alternatives that everyone ranks near the bottom. When the number of individuals is divisible by two or more distinct primes, RNA rules only exist for a small (finite) number of values of the number of alternatives.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)109-111
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume132
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2015

Keywords

  • Anonymity
  • Frobenius number
  • Neutrality
  • Perverse
  • Resoluteness
  • Schur's theorem

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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