The electoral bases of small tax states in Japan, South Korea, and the US

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This chapter looks at the electoral bases of tax politics. More specifically, it seeks to examine whether electoral systems and frequency of elections affect the levels of taxation. Methodologically, we adopt a mixed method strategy that combines statistical analysis with more descriptive qualitative case studies of three key cases—Japan, South Korea, and the United States. We found that the plurality electoral system and the frequency of national elections constrained governments’ abilities to raise tax revenue by introducing new taxes and raising tax rates. In short, these three small welfare states are similarly constrained in their tax capacities because of the way in which their elections take place.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Small Welfare State
Subtitle of host publicationRethinking Welfare in the US, Japan, and South Korea
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Pages114-139
Number of pages26
ISBN (Electronic)9781839104619
ISBN (Print)9781839104602
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

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