The costs of conflict: A choice-theoretic, equilibrium analysis

Yang Ming Chang, Shane Sanders, Bhavneet Walia

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

In models of (destructive) armed conflict, it is standard to account for the endogeneity of arming allocations made by incumbent government and rebel parties. Indeed, standard contest-theoretic (microeconomic) models of behavior recognize that allocations change with shifts in marginal benefit or marginal cost. Taking governments and rebels as responsive to such shifts, the present study applies standard, contest-theoretic, equilibrium analysis to the Smith et al. (2014) model of conflict and cooperation. This alternative solution methodology yields starkly different results. Within the present analysis, there does not exist greater scope for cooperation given endogenously-destructive arming rather than exogenously-destructive arming.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)62-65
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume131
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Armed conflict
  • Destruction
  • Equilibrium analysis
  • Settlement

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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