The ascription of meaning: A Wittgensteinian perspective

Richard Buttny

doi:10.1080/00335638609383773

The ascription of meaning: A Wittgensteinian perspective

Richard Buttny

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

Following Wittgenstein’s concept of meaning-as-use, this essay argues that the ascription of meaning should be based on the satisfaction of contextual criteria. The usefulness of this notion is demonstrated by showing how it can serve as a bridging concept between general rules and situated contexts.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	261-273
Number of pages	13
Journal	Quarterly Journal of Speech
Volume	72
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/00335638609383773
State	Published - Aug 1986
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Communication
Language and Linguistics
Education

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10.1080/00335638609383773

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The ascription of meaning: A Wittgensteinian perspective

Abstract

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