Strategy-proofness and weighted voting

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

A strict social welfare function (SSWF) that always yields an asymmetric binary relation with a single maximal alternative induces a social choice rule on its domain. It is known that if the induced rule is strategy-proof then it can also be generated by a SSWF satisfying non-reversal. This paper proves that a SSWF satisfying anonymity and IIA satisfies non-reversal if and only if it is a weighted voting rule. If there are less than six voters then a SSWF satisfying neutrality and IIA satisfies non-reversal if and only if it is a weighted voting rule, but this equivalence does not hold for more than five voters.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)15-23
Number of pages9
JournalMathematical social sciences
Volume60
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2010

Keywords

  • Non-reversal
  • Strategy-proof
  • Weighted voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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