Strategic substitutes or complements? the game of where to fish

Robert L. Hicks; William C. Horrace; Kurt E. Schnier

doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.09.007

Strategic substitutes or complements? the game of where to fish

Robert L. Hicks, William C. Horrace, Kurt E. Schnier

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

The "global game with strategic substitutes and complements" of Karp et al. (2007) is used to model the decision of where to fish. A complete information game is assumed, but the model is generalized to S>1 sites. In this game, a fisherman's payoff depends on fish density in each site and the actions of other fishermen which can lead to congestion or agglomeration effects. Stable and unstable equilibria are characterized, as well as notions of equilibrium dominance. The model is applied to the Alaskan flatfish fishery by specifying a strategic interaction function (response to congestion) that is a non-linear function of the degree of congestion present in a given site. Results suggest that the interaction function may be non-monotonic in congestion.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	70-80
Number of pages	11
Journal	Journal of Econometrics
Volume	168
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.09.007
State	Published - May 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.09.007

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title = "Strategic substitutes or complements? the game of where to fish",

abstract = "The {"}global game with strategic substitutes and complements{"} of Karp et al. (2007) is used to model the decision of where to fish. A complete information game is assumed, but the model is generalized to S>1 sites. In this game, a fisherman's payoff depends on fish density in each site and the actions of other fishermen which can lead to congestion or agglomeration effects. Stable and unstable equilibria are characterized, as well as notions of equilibrium dominance. The model is applied to the Alaskan flatfish fishery by specifying a strategic interaction function (response to congestion) that is a non-linear function of the degree of congestion present in a given site. Results suggest that the interaction function may be non-monotonic in congestion.",

author = "Hicks, {Robert L.} and Horrace, {William C.} and Schnier, {Kurt E.}",

note = "Funding Information: Portions of this research were completed while the second author was visiting the College of Natural Resources at Berkeley; he thanks Larry Karp for insightful discussions on game theory, bars, and Yogi Berra. The second and third authors acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation. The comments of Andres Aradillas-Lopez, Chris Timmins and participants at the conference on The Econometrics of Auctions and Games are acknowledged.",

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AU - Horrace, William C.

AU - Schnier, Kurt E.

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AB - The "global game with strategic substitutes and complements" of Karp et al. (2007) is used to model the decision of where to fish. A complete information game is assumed, but the model is generalized to S>1 sites. In this game, a fisherman's payoff depends on fish density in each site and the actions of other fishermen which can lead to congestion or agglomeration effects. Stable and unstable equilibria are characterized, as well as notions of equilibrium dominance. The model is applied to the Alaskan flatfish fishery by specifying a strategic interaction function (response to congestion) that is a non-linear function of the degree of congestion present in a given site. Results suggest that the interaction function may be non-monotonic in congestion.

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Strategic substitutes or complements? the game of where to fish

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