Strategic power allocation with incomplete information in the presence of a jammer

Raghed El-Bardan, Swastik Brahma, Pramod K. Varshney

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

36 Scopus citations


In this paper, distributed competitive interactions between a secondary user (SU) transmitter-receiver pair and a jammer are investigated using a game-theoretic framework under physical interference restrictions, power budget constraints, and incomplete knowledge of channel gains. In this game, the SU transmitter is expected to choose its power strategy with the objective of satisfying a minimum signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at the corresponding receiver. Similarly, the jammer's objective is to strategically allocate its power so that the SINR constraint of the SU is not satisfied. Due to a lack of complete information, this strategic power allocation problem between the two players is modeled as a Bayesian game for which the self-enforcing strategies of the SU transmitter-receiver pair and the jammer are analyzed. Furthermore, probability distributions are employed by the corresponding players to model the incomplete nature of the game. The solution of the game corresponds to Nash equilibria points. Equilibrium analysis is carried out by considering the mixed strategy solution space and numerical examples are presented for illustration.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number7486103
Pages (from-to)3467-3479
Number of pages13
JournalIEEE Transactions on Communications
Issue number8
StatePublished - Aug 2016


  • Bayesian games
  • Cognitive radio networks
  • Game theory
  • Jamming
  • Power allocation
  • Spectrum sharing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


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