Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives

Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0193-0

Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

In the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition disallows both anonymity and neutrality.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	69-82
Number of pages	14
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	29
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0193-0
State	Published - Jul 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics

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abstract = "In the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition disallows both anonymity and neutrality.",

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Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives

Abstract

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