Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

In the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition disallows both anonymity and neutrality.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)69-82
Number of pages14
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume29
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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