### Abstract

X is a finite set of alternatives that is to be socially ordered (as a function of individual preferences). We are given an arbitrary measure on X. If f is a transitive valued social welfare function that satisfies Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, then for any fraction t, either some individual dictates on a subset of X of measure at least t, or else the set of ordered pairs of distinct alternatives that are socially ordered without consulting anyone's preferences has a product measure ≥ 1 - t. (The result can be extended to countably infinite X.).

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 99-104 |

Number of pages | 6 |

Journal | Economics Letters |

Volume | 50 |

Issue number | 1 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Jan 1996 |

### Keywords

- Fuzzy
- Measure
- Social welfare function
- Trade-off
- Uncertainty

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics

## Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Social choice trade-offs for an arbitrary measure: With application to uncertain or fuzzy agenda'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

## Cite this

Campbell, D. E., & Kelly, J. S. (1996). Social choice trade-offs for an arbitrary measure: With application to uncertain or fuzzy agenda.

*Economics Letters*,*50*(1), 99-104. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(95)00711-3