Social choice trade-offs for an arbitrary measure: With application to uncertain or fuzzy agenda

Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(95)00711-3

Social choice trade-offs for an arbitrary measure: With application to uncertain or fuzzy agenda

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

X is a finite set of alternatives that is to be socially ordered (as a function of individual preferences). We are given an arbitrary measure on X. If f is a transitive valued social welfare function that satisfies Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, then for any fraction t, either some individual dictates on a subset of X of measure at least t, or else the set of ordered pairs of distinct alternatives that are socially ordered without consulting anyone's preferences has a product measure ≥ 1 - t. (The result can be extended to countably infinite X.).

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	99-104
Number of pages	6
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	50
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(95)00711-3
State	Published - Jan 1996

Keywords

Fuzzy
Measure
Social welfare function
Trade-off
Uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0165-1765(95)00711-3

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abstract = "X is a finite set of alternatives that is to be socially ordered (as a function of individual preferences). We are given an arbitrary measure on X. If f is a transitive valued social welfare function that satisfies Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, then for any fraction t, either some individual dictates on a subset of X of measure at least t, or else the set of ordered pairs of distinct alternatives that are socially ordered without consulting anyone's preferences has a product measure ≥ 1 - t. (The result can be extended to countably infinite X.).",

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AB - X is a finite set of alternatives that is to be socially ordered (as a function of individual preferences). We are given an arbitrary measure on X. If f is a transitive valued social welfare function that satisfies Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, then for any fraction t, either some individual dictates on a subset of X of measure at least t, or else the set of ordered pairs of distinct alternatives that are socially ordered without consulting anyone's preferences has a product measure ≥ 1 - t. (The result can be extended to countably infinite X.).

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KW - Uncertainty

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Social choice trade-offs for an arbitrary measure: With application to uncertain or fuzzy agenda

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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