Social choice trade-offs for an arbitrary measure: With application to uncertain or fuzzy agenda

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

X is a finite set of alternatives that is to be socially ordered (as a function of individual preferences). We are given an arbitrary measure on X. If f is a transitive valued social welfare function that satisfies Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, then for any fraction t, either some individual dictates on a subset of X of measure at least t, or else the set of ordered pairs of distinct alternatives that are socially ordered without consulting anyone's preferences has a product measure ≥ 1 - t. (The result can be extended to countably infinite X.).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)99-104
Number of pages6
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume50
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1996

Keywords

  • Fuzzy
  • Measure
  • Social welfare function
  • Trade-off
  • Uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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