Sen's theorem and externalities

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

When the outcome space X is a product set, the Paretian-liberal conflict depends on a special cycle of externalities. Even if the society is countably infinite, the inconsistency vanishes if the individuals can be numbered so that person I does not care about the actions of any h < i, although we assume that the liberal constraint is binding only on finite coalitions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)375-386
Number of pages12
JournalEconomica
Volume64
Issue number255
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1997

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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    Campbell, D. E., & Kelly, J. S. (1997). Sen's theorem and externalities. Economica, 64(255), 375-386. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00086