Relaxing Pareto optimality in economic environments

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


The individual preference domain is the family of profiles of economic preferences on the set of allocations of public or private goods, or both. The agenda domain assumption allows for a finite lower bound on the size of a feasible set. If a social choice correspondence satisfies nonimposition, Arrow's choice axiom, and independence of infeasible alternatives then it is directly or inversely dictatorial, or null.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)115-130
Number of pages16
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jun 1997

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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