Radio-as-a-Service: Auction-based model and mechanisms

Jing Wang, Dejun Yang, Jian Tang, Mustafa Cenk Gursoy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Entry/PoemConference contribution

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

We envision that in the near future, just as Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), radios and radio resources in a wireless network can also be provisioned as a service to Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), which we refer to as Radio-as-a-Service (RaaS). In this paper, we present a novel auction-based model to enable fair pricing and fair resource allocation according to real-time needs of MVNOs for RaaS. Based on the proposed model, we study the auction mechanism design with the objective of maximizing social welfare. First, we present an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) based auction mechanism for obtaining optimal social welfare. To reduce time complexity, we present a polynomial-time greedy mechanism for the RaaS auction. Both methods have been formally shown to be truthful and individually rational. Extensive simulation results show that the proposed greedy auction mechanism can quickly produce close-to-optimal solutions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages3567-3572
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781467364324
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 9 2015
EventIEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015 - London, United Kingdom
Duration: Jun 8 2015Jun 12 2015

Publication series

NameIEEE International Conference on Communications
Volume2015-September
ISSN (Print)1550-3607

Other

OtherIEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityLondon
Period6/8/156/12/15

Keywords

  • Auction
  • Cloud Computing
  • Radio-as-a-Service

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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