Quasitransitive social preference: Why some very large coalitions have very little power

Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1007/s001990050214

Quasitransitive social preference: Why some very large coalitions have very little power

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Scopus citations

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	147-162
Number of pages	16
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	12
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050214
State	Published - 1998

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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title = "Quasitransitive social preference: Why some very large coalitions have very little power",

author = "Campbell, {Donald E.} and Kelly, {Jerry S.}",

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AU - Kelly, Jerry S.

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Quasitransitive social preference: Why some very large coalitions have very little power

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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