TY - JOUR
T1 - Protection versus promotion
T2 - An empirical investigation
AU - Mitra, Devashish
AU - Thomakos, Dimitrios D.
AU - Ulubaşoǧlu, Mehmet A.
PY - 2004/7
Y1 - 2004/7
N2 - Using Turkish industry-level data from 1983 to 1990, we find that politically organized industries receive both higher protection and promotion than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing (increasing) in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demand elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. Subsidy rates are decreasing (increasing) in the output-supply elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. The results are consistent with the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman model and its extension in this paper. The mix of protection and promotion is inversely related to the ratio of their respective marginal deadweight cost measures.
AB - Using Turkish industry-level data from 1983 to 1990, we find that politically organized industries receive both higher protection and promotion than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing (increasing) in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demand elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. Subsidy rates are decreasing (increasing) in the output-supply elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. The results are consistent with the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman model and its extension in this paper. The mix of protection and promotion is inversely related to the ratio of their respective marginal deadweight cost measures.
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00135.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00135.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:3142721865
SN - 0954-1985
VL - 16
SP - 147
EP - 162
JO - Economics and Politics
JF - Economics and Politics
IS - 2
ER -