Protection versus promotion: An empirical investigation

Devashish Mitra, Dimitrios D. Thomakos, Mehmet A. Ulubaşoǧlu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Using Turkish industry-level data from 1983 to 1990, we find that politically organized industries receive both higher protection and promotion than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing (increasing) in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demand elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. Subsidy rates are decreasing (increasing) in the output-supply elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. The results are consistent with the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman model and its extension in this paper. The mix of protection and promotion is inversely related to the ratio of their respective marginal deadweight cost measures.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)147-162
Number of pages16
JournalEconomics and Politics
Volume16
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2004

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Protection versus promotion: An empirical investigation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this