TY - GEN
T1 - Profit maximization for utility companies in an oligopolistic energy market with dynamic prices
AU - Cui, Tiansong
AU - Wang, Yanzhi
AU - Goudarzi, Hadi
AU - Nazarian, Shahin
AU - Pedram, Massoud
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - Dynamic pricing and demand response are the key elements of the smart grid technologies. Utility companies can incentivize electricity customers to schedule their power hungry tasks during off-peak times of the day whereas demand response manages customers' electricity consumption in response to supply conditions or market prices. The reaction of consumers to dynamic prices creates a feedback system in the smart grid that motivates the utility companies to model the consumers' behavior in the process of determining the price. Letting the consumers select their provider of choice among multiple utility companies, may be modeled as a non-cooperative game. In this paper, we consider the process of determining dynamic electricity prices for electricity based on a modified Bertrand Competition Model of consumer behavior and in view of competition among multiple non-cooperative utility companies in an oligopolistic energy market. The proposed method maximizes the conservative estimate on the profit for each utility company. Results also demonstrate the effectiveness of the oligopolistic electrical market in decreasing the electricity cost to consumers.
AB - Dynamic pricing and demand response are the key elements of the smart grid technologies. Utility companies can incentivize electricity customers to schedule their power hungry tasks during off-peak times of the day whereas demand response manages customers' electricity consumption in response to supply conditions or market prices. The reaction of consumers to dynamic prices creates a feedback system in the smart grid that motivates the utility companies to model the consumers' behavior in the process of determining the price. Letting the consumers select their provider of choice among multiple utility companies, may be modeled as a non-cooperative game. In this paper, we consider the process of determining dynamic electricity prices for electricity based on a modified Bertrand Competition Model of consumer behavior and in view of competition among multiple non-cooperative utility companies in an oligopolistic energy market. The proposed method maximizes the conservative estimate on the profit for each utility company. Results also demonstrate the effectiveness of the oligopolistic electrical market in decreasing the electricity cost to consumers.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84879475815&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/GreenCom.2012.6519621
DO - 10.1109/GreenCom.2012.6519621
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84879475815
SN - 9781479903962
T3 - 2012 IEEE Online Conference on Green Communications, GreenCom 2012
SP - 86
EP - 91
BT - 2012 IEEE Online Conference on Green Communications, GreenCom 2012
T2 - 2012 IEEE Online Conference on Green Communications, GreenCom 2012
Y2 - 25 September 2012 through 28 September 2012
ER -