Privatization in emerging economies: An agency theory perspective

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

511 Scopus citations


The ineffectiveness of several privatized firms within emerging economies underscores the importance of agency theory issues and their impact on the privatization-performance relationship. We argue that weak governance and limited protection of minority shareholders intensify traditional principal-agent problems (perquisite consumption and entrenchment) and create unique agency problems (expropriation). We suggest that postprivatization performance can be enhanced by using appropriate ownership, management, and corporate structures that mitigate agency problems in the context of weak governance, and we highlight avenues for research.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)650-669
Number of pages20
JournalAcademy of Management Review
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jul 2000

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Business, Management and Accounting
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation


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