Political costs and fiscal benefits: The political economy of residential property value assessment under Proposition 212

Michael Makowsky, Shane Sanders

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We use a 15-year panel of property value assessment data from 351 Massachusetts municipalities. Appraised values grow more slowly in municipalities with elected assessors. When municipalities pass, via referenda, large increases in the cap on tax revenues, value assessments grow faster under appointed assessors and slower under elected assessors. Appraisals grow slower when alternative revenue sources are available.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)359-363
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume120
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2013
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Elected versus appointed
  • Property appraisal
  • Property taxes
  • Tax referenda

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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