Political costs and fiscal benefits: The political economy of residential property value assessment under Proposition 212

Michael Makowsky; Shane Sanders

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.010

Political costs and fiscal benefits: The political economy of residential property value assessment under Proposition 212

Michael Makowsky, Shane Sanders

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We use a 15-year panel of property value assessment data from 351 Massachusetts municipalities. Appraised values grow more slowly in municipalities with elected assessors. When municipalities pass, via referenda, large increases in the cap on tax revenues, value assessments grow faster under appointed assessors and slower under elected assessors. Appraisals grow slower when alternative revenue sources are available.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	359-363
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	120
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.010
State	Published - Sep 2013
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Elected versus appointed
Property appraisal
Property taxes
Tax referenda

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.010

Cite this

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title = "Political costs and fiscal benefits: The political economy of residential property value assessment under Proposition 212",

abstract = "We use a 15-year panel of property value assessment data from 351 Massachusetts municipalities. Appraised values grow more slowly in municipalities with elected assessors. When municipalities pass, via referenda, large increases in the cap on tax revenues, value assessments grow faster under appointed assessors and slower under elected assessors. Appraisals grow slower when alternative revenue sources are available.",

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author = "Michael Makowsky and Shane Sanders",

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AB - We use a 15-year panel of property value assessment data from 351 Massachusetts municipalities. Appraised values grow more slowly in municipalities with elected assessors. When municipalities pass, via referenda, large increases in the cap on tax revenues, value assessments grow faster under appointed assessors and slower under elected assessors. Appraisals grow slower when alternative revenue sources are available.

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KW - Property appraisal

KW - Property taxes

KW - Tax referenda

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Political costs and fiscal benefits: The political economy of residential property value assessment under Proposition 212

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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