Pareto, anonymity, and independence: Four alternatives

Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0194-z

Pareto, anonymity, and independence: Four alternatives

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

For four alternatives and an even number of individuals, we prove a conjecture in a companion paper: It is impossible for a social choice rule to satisfy all of (1) Pareto, (2) anonymity, (3) full domain, and (4) independence of some alternative, a relaxation of Arrow's IIA.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	83-104
Number of pages	22
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	29
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0194-z
State	Published - Jul 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics

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Pareto, anonymity, and independence: Four alternatives

Abstract

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