Pareto, anonymity, and independence: Four alternatives

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations


For four alternatives and an even number of individuals, we prove a conjecture in a companion paper: It is impossible for a social choice rule to satisfy all of (1) Pareto, (2) anonymity, (3) full domain, and (4) independence of some alternative, a relaxation of Arrow's IIA.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)83-104
Number of pages22
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jul 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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