Optimal Spectrum Auction Design With 2-D Truthful Revelations Under Uncertain Spectrum Availability

V. Sriram Siddhardh Nadendla, Swastik K. Brahma, Pramod Kumar Varshney

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a novel sealed-bid auction framework to address the problem of dynamic spectrum allocation in cognitive radio (CR) networks. We design an optimal auction mechanism that maximizes the moderator's expected utility, when the spectrum is not available with certainty. We assume that the moderator employs collaborative spectrum sensing in order to make a reliable inference about spectrum availability. Due to the presence of a collision cost whenever the moderator makes an erroneous inference, and a sensing cost at each CR, we investigate feasibility conditions that guarantee a non-negative utility at the moderator. Since the moderator fuses CRs' sensing decisions to obtain a global inference regarding spectrum availability, we propose a novel strategy-proof fusion rule that encourages the CRs to simultaneously reveal truthful sensing decisions, along with truthful valuations to the moderator. We also present tight theoretical bounds on instantaneous network throughput achieved by our auction mechanism. Numerical examples are presented to provide insights into the performance of the proposed auction under different scenarios.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jul 21 2016

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Software
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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