Optimal Auction Design with Quantized Bids

Nianxia Cao, Swastik Brahma, Pramod Kumar Varshney

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object into binary values prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism maximizes the utility of the seller (i.e., the auction is optimal), prevents buyers from communicating falsified quantized bids (i.e., the auction is incentive compatible), and ensures that buyers will participate in the auction (i.e., the auction is individually rational). The letter also investigates the design of the optimal quantization thresholds using which buyers quantize their private value estimates. Numerical results provide insights regarding the influence of the quantization thresholds on the auction mechanism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1518-1522
Number of pages5
JournalIEEE Signal Processing Letters
Volume23
Issue number11
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2016

Keywords

  • Auctions
  • binary bids
  • mechanism design
  • quantization
  • resource constrained network

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Signal Processing
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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