Optimal Auction Design with Quantized Bids

Nianxia Cao; Swastik Brahma; Pramod K. Varshney

doi:10.1109/LSP.2016.2604280

Optimal Auction Design with Quantized Bids

Nianxia Cao, Swastik Brahma, Pramod K. Varshney

Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object into binary values prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism maximizes the utility of the seller (i.e., the auction is optimal), prevents buyers from communicating falsified quantized bids (i.e., the auction is incentive compatible), and ensures that buyers will participate in the auction (i.e., the auction is individually rational). The letter also investigates the design of the optimal quantization thresholds using which buyers quantize their private value estimates. Numerical results provide insights regarding the influence of the quantization thresholds on the auction mechanism.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1518-1522
Number of pages	5
Journal	IEEE Signal Processing Letters
Volume	23
Issue number	11
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/LSP.2016.2604280
State	Published - Nov 2016

Keywords

Auctions
binary bids
mechanism design
quantization
resource constrained network

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Signal Processing
Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Applied Mathematics

Access to Document

10.1109/LSP.2016.2604280

Cite this

@article{4984e24f7fba453e9ac690e16c189ded,

title = "Optimal Auction Design with Quantized Bids",

abstract = "This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object into binary values prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism maximizes the utility of the seller (i.e., the auction is optimal), prevents buyers from communicating falsified quantized bids (i.e., the auction is incentive compatible), and ensures that buyers will participate in the auction (i.e., the auction is individually rational). The letter also investigates the design of the optimal quantization thresholds using which buyers quantize their private value estimates. Numerical results provide insights regarding the influence of the quantization thresholds on the auction mechanism.",

keywords = "Auctions, binary bids, mechanism design, quantization, resource constrained network",

author = "Nianxia Cao and Swastik Brahma and Varshney, {Pramod K.}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017 IEEE.",

year = "2016",

month = nov,

doi = "10.1109/LSP.2016.2604280",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "23",

pages = "1518--1522",

journal = "IEEE Signal Processing Letters",

issn = "1070-9908",

publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

number = "11",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimal Auction Design with Quantized Bids

AU - Cao, Nianxia

AU - Brahma, Swastik

AU - Varshney, Pramod K.

PY - 2016/11

Y1 - 2016/11

N2 - This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object into binary values prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism maximizes the utility of the seller (i.e., the auction is optimal), prevents buyers from communicating falsified quantized bids (i.e., the auction is incentive compatible), and ensures that buyers will participate in the auction (i.e., the auction is individually rational). The letter also investigates the design of the optimal quantization thresholds using which buyers quantize their private value estimates. Numerical results provide insights regarding the influence of the quantization thresholds on the auction mechanism.

AB - This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object into binary values prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism maximizes the utility of the seller (i.e., the auction is optimal), prevents buyers from communicating falsified quantized bids (i.e., the auction is incentive compatible), and ensures that buyers will participate in the auction (i.e., the auction is individually rational). The letter also investigates the design of the optimal quantization thresholds using which buyers quantize their private value estimates. Numerical results provide insights regarding the influence of the quantization thresholds on the auction mechanism.

KW - Auctions

KW - binary bids

KW - mechanism design

KW - quantization

KW - resource constrained network

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85027576147&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85027576147&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/LSP.2016.2604280

DO - 10.1109/LSP.2016.2604280

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85027576147

SN - 1070-9908

VL - 23

SP - 1518

EP - 1522

JO - IEEE Signal Processing Letters

JF - IEEE Signal Processing Letters

IS - 11

ER -

Optimal Auction Design with Quantized Bids

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this