TY - JOUR
T1 - Online Quality-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing with Extra Bonus
AU - Gao, Hui
AU - Liu, Chi Harold
AU - Tang, Jian
AU - Yang, Dejun
AU - Hui, Pan
AU - Wang, Wendong
N1 - Funding Information:
Hui Gao work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No.61602051) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities under Grant 2017RC11, and by the Open Foundation of State key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications) (SKLNST-2016-2-04). Chi Harold Liu research was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61772072). C. H. Liu and H. Gao contributed equally to this work. Jian Tang research was supported in part by NSF grant 1525920.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.
PY - 2019/11/1
Y1 - 2019/11/1
N2 - Mobile crowd sensing is a new paradigm that enables smart mobile devices to collect and share various types of sensing data in urban environments. However, new challenges arise: One is how to evaluate the quality of data each mobile user potentially is capable of providing; another is how to allocate a satisfactory yet profitable amount of reward to mobile users in order to keep them participating in crowd sensing tasks. In this paper, we first introduce a mathematical model for characterizing quality of sensing data to be contributed by mobile users. Then, we present a utility function and formulate an optimization problem for the platform, who recruits participants to contribute sensing data, to maximize the amount of high quality sensing data under a limited task budget. We next present an effective and quality-aware incentive mechanism to solve this problem for online scenarios where participants may arrive or leave at any random time. Moreover, the proposed incentive mechanism allows the platform to provide selected participants with an extra bonus according to task completion level and their previous performance to motivate them further. We formally show the proposed mechanism has the desirable properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, budgetary feasibility, and computational efficiency. We compare the proposed scheme with existing methods via simulation using a real dataset. Extensive simulation results well justify the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed approach, e.g, compared with another online method OMG, the gap to the optimum for our proposed Online-QIM approach is reduce by 33.3 percent when budget B = 1000.
AB - Mobile crowd sensing is a new paradigm that enables smart mobile devices to collect and share various types of sensing data in urban environments. However, new challenges arise: One is how to evaluate the quality of data each mobile user potentially is capable of providing; another is how to allocate a satisfactory yet profitable amount of reward to mobile users in order to keep them participating in crowd sensing tasks. In this paper, we first introduce a mathematical model for characterizing quality of sensing data to be contributed by mobile users. Then, we present a utility function and formulate an optimization problem for the platform, who recruits participants to contribute sensing data, to maximize the amount of high quality sensing data under a limited task budget. We next present an effective and quality-aware incentive mechanism to solve this problem for online scenarios where participants may arrive or leave at any random time. Moreover, the proposed incentive mechanism allows the platform to provide selected participants with an extra bonus according to task completion level and their previous performance to motivate them further. We formally show the proposed mechanism has the desirable properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, budgetary feasibility, and computational efficiency. We compare the proposed scheme with existing methods via simulation using a real dataset. Extensive simulation results well justify the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed approach, e.g, compared with another online method OMG, the gap to the optimum for our proposed Online-QIM approach is reduce by 33.3 percent when budget B = 1000.
KW - Mobile crowd sensing
KW - data quality
KW - incentive mechanism design
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U2 - 10.1109/TMC.2018.2877459
DO - 10.1109/TMC.2018.2877459
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85055177561
SN - 1536-1233
VL - 18
SP - 2589
EP - 2603
JO - IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
JF - IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
IS - 11
M1 - 8502067
ER -