On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

A social welfare function is Arrovian if it is transitive-valued and satisfies IIA. We examine the logical relation between the statements (A) If f is Arrovian with domain ℘ then it is dictatorial if it satisfies the Pareto criterion and (W) If f is Arrovian with domain ℘ then it is dictatorial or inversely dictatorial if it is non-null and satisfies non-imposition. We exhibit a class of domains on which W implies A and another on which A implies W. We also present examples of domains on which one of the statements is true and the other is false.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)273-281
Number of pages9
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume20
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2003

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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