Necessity conditions in voting theory

Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Scopus citations


In this paper we take some concepts of necessity conditions in voting theory first developed by Inada, Sen, and Pattanaik and refine those concepts to deal with the more commonly discussed case of fixed numbers of voters. These new concepts are then applied to the study of domain restrictions designed to yield quasitransitive and transitive social preference relations. Along the way, a conjecture of Pattanaik is settled.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)149-160
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Jun 1974

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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