Mitigating agency risk between investors and ventures’ managers

Cristiano Bellavitis, Dzidziso Samuel Kamuriwo, Ulrich Hommel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The general management literature has long focused on the agency risks involved in the relationship between general managers and shareholders. Shareholders can deploy contractual and noncontractual mechanisms to reduce these inefficiencies. This study examines—based on a broad international sample of investment contracts—how the use of contractual and noncontractual mechanisms is related to the degree of risks associated with the venture’s development stage as well as how these practices differ across countries. Hypotheses are tested using a proprietary data set of 265 hand-collected investment contracts associated with ventures in the United States, Israel, and nine European countries. Findings suggest that the use of mitigating contractual and noncontractual mechanisms is related to the degree of agency risks and that these practices vary across countries. This study draws implications for how investors can best deploy their capital in different institutional settings while nurturing their relationships with managers and entrepreneurs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)33-43
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of General Management
Volume43
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2017
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • adverse selection
  • agency risks
  • agency theory
  • investment contracts
  • moral hazard

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
  • Strategy and Management

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