Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda

Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.024

Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

There are two feasible alternatives. We impose a weak version of anonymity on an arbitrary social choice function, which selects a single alternative at each profile. It implies majority rule in the presence of neutrality and monotonicity.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	272-273
Number of pages	2
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	110
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.024
State	Published - Mar 2011

Keywords

Anonymity
Monotonicity
Neutrality
Social choice function

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.024

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title = "Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda",

abstract = "There are two feasible alternatives. We impose a weak version of anonymity on an arbitrary social choice function, which selects a single alternative at each profile. It implies majority rule in the presence of neutrality and monotonicity.",

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KW - Social choice function

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JF - Economics Letters

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Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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