Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations


There are two feasible alternatives. We impose a weak version of anonymity on an arbitrary social choice function, which selects a single alternative at each profile. It implies majority rule in the presence of neutrality and monotonicity.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)272-273
Number of pages2
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number3
StatePublished - Mar 1 2011


  • Anonymity
  • Monotonicity
  • Neutrality
  • Social choice function

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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