Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


In a companion paper, "Gains from Manipulating Social Choice Rules," we analyzed the incentive to manipulate by considering the maximum number of ranks someone can gain in their preference ordering by manipulation. This paper treats the number of ranks someone else can lose due to manipulation. We find large classes of rules where that loss is very large, a few rules where the loss can be significantly smaller, and even some rules where no one ever loses-even though manipulation will take place.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)453-467
Number of pages15
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2010


  • Gains
  • Losses
  • Manipulations
  • Social choice rules

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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