Lobbying and the collective action problem

Comparative evidence from enterprise surveys

Benjamin Barber, Jan Pierskalla, Simon Weschle

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Industry lobbying is traditionally thought of as a non-excludable good subject to collective action problems that are most easily solved by concentrated industries. However, there is very little empirical support for this hypothesis. In this paper, we address a major shortcoming of existing work on the topic: Its nearexclusive reliance on data from the US. Using comparative firm-level survey data from up to 74 countries, we construct an industry-level indicator of concentration and test its effect on firms' lobbying activity. Using multilevel Extreme Bounds Analysis and Bayesian Variable Selection techniques to account for model uncertainty, we find no evidence that industry concentration is a predictor of lobbying activity. We discuss the implications of these non-findings for the literature and outline possible avenues for further research.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)221-246
Number of pages26
JournalBusiness and Politics
Volume16
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2014
Externally publishedYes

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collective behavior
industry
evidence
firm
uncertainty
Lobbying
Industry
Collective action

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Industrial relations
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Lobbying and the collective action problem : Comparative evidence from enterprise surveys. / Barber, Benjamin; Pierskalla, Jan; Weschle, Simon.

In: Business and Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2, 01.08.2014, p. 221-246.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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