Literacy, Information, and Party System Fragmentation in India

Arturas Rozenas, Anoop Sadanandan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

A rich theoretical literature argues that, in contradiction to Duverger’s law, the plurality voting rule can fail to produce two-party system when voters do not share their common information about the electoral situation. We present an empirical operationalization and a series of tests of this informational hypothesis in the case of India using constituency- and individual-level data. In highly illiterate constituencies where access to information and information sharing among voters is low, voters often fail to coordinate on the two most viable parties. In highly literate constituencies, voters are far more successful at avoiding vote-wasting—in line with the informational hypothesis. At a microlevel, these aggregate-level patterns are driven by the interaction of individual information and the informational context: In dense informational environments, even low-information voters can successfully identify viable parties and vote for them, but in sparse informational environments, individual access to information is essential for successful strategic voting.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalComparative Political Studies
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jun 1 2017

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party system
fragmentation
information system
literacy
India
voting
voter
two-party system
operationalization
Law
interaction

Keywords

  • electoral coordination
  • India
  • information and voting
  • representation and electoral systems

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Literacy, Information, and Party System Fragmentation in India. / Rozenas, Arturas; Sadanandan, Anoop.

In: Comparative Political Studies, 01.06.2017.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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