Abstract
In this paper, competitive interactions between a secondary transmitter-receiver pair and a jammer are investigated in a distributed manner over N orthogonal frequency bands, each of which is licensed to a primary user (PU). There is an interference restriction at the secondary receiver (SR) and power budget constraints at the secondary transmitter (ST) and the jammer. In addition, the ST (jammer) does not know the channels' gains of the jammer (ST). After sensing each of the frequency bands, the ST and the jammer decide how to transmit information and how to block these transmissions respectively. In this respect, both the ST and the jammer incur a communication cost and the SR sends an acknowledgment (ACK) if it decodes the information correctly. Otherwise, it sends a negative ACK (NACK). The strategic and distributed power allocation between the ST and the jammer is modeled as a stochastic game in which we employ a multiplicative weight no-regret learning mechanism to obtain an equilibrium point.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 2016 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2016 - Proceedings |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
| Pages | 1104-1109 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781509045457 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 19 2017 |
| Event | 2016 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2016 - Washington, United States Duration: Dec 7 2016 → Dec 9 2016 |
Other
| Other | 2016 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2016 |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | United States |
| City | Washington |
| Period | 12/7/16 → 12/9/16 |
Keywords
- Cognitive radio networks
- Game theory
- Jammer
- Learning and coarse-correlated equilibrium
- Power allocation
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Signal Processing
- Computer Networks and Communications