TY - GEN
T1 - Learning equilibria for power allocation games in cognitive radio networks with a jammer
AU - El-Bardan, Raghed
AU - Sharma, Vinod
AU - Varshney, Pramod K.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 IEEE.
PY - 2017/4/19
Y1 - 2017/4/19
N2 - In this paper, competitive interactions between a secondary transmitter-receiver pair and a jammer are investigated in a distributed manner over N orthogonal frequency bands, each of which is licensed to a primary user (PU). There is an interference restriction at the secondary receiver (SR) and power budget constraints at the secondary transmitter (ST) and the jammer. In addition, the ST (jammer) does not know the channels' gains of the jammer (ST). After sensing each of the frequency bands, the ST and the jammer decide how to transmit information and how to block these transmissions respectively. In this respect, both the ST and the jammer incur a communication cost and the SR sends an acknowledgment (ACK) if it decodes the information correctly. Otherwise, it sends a negative ACK (NACK). The strategic and distributed power allocation between the ST and the jammer is modeled as a stochastic game in which we employ a multiplicative weight no-regret learning mechanism to obtain an equilibrium point.
AB - In this paper, competitive interactions between a secondary transmitter-receiver pair and a jammer are investigated in a distributed manner over N orthogonal frequency bands, each of which is licensed to a primary user (PU). There is an interference restriction at the secondary receiver (SR) and power budget constraints at the secondary transmitter (ST) and the jammer. In addition, the ST (jammer) does not know the channels' gains of the jammer (ST). After sensing each of the frequency bands, the ST and the jammer decide how to transmit information and how to block these transmissions respectively. In this respect, both the ST and the jammer incur a communication cost and the SR sends an acknowledgment (ACK) if it decodes the information correctly. Otherwise, it sends a negative ACK (NACK). The strategic and distributed power allocation between the ST and the jammer is modeled as a stochastic game in which we employ a multiplicative weight no-regret learning mechanism to obtain an equilibrium point.
KW - Cognitive radio networks
KW - Game theory
KW - Jammer
KW - Learning and coarse-correlated equilibrium
KW - Power allocation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85019188240&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85019188240&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/GlobalSIP.2016.7906013
DO - 10.1109/GlobalSIP.2016.7906013
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85019188240
T3 - 2016 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2016 - Proceedings
SP - 1104
EP - 1109
BT - 2016 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2016 - Proceedings
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2016 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2016
Y2 - 7 December 2016 through 9 December 2016
ER -