TY - GEN
T1 - LAD
T2 - 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, IPDPS 2005
AU - Du, Wenliang
AU - Fang, Lei
AU - Ning, Peng
PY - 2005/12/1
Y1 - 2005/12/1
N2 - In wireless sensor networks (WSNs), sensors' locations play a critical role in many applications. Having a GPS receiver on every sensor node is costly. In the past, a number of location discovery (localization) schemes have been proposed. Most of these schemes share a common feature: they use some special nodes, called beacon nodes, which are assumed to know their own locations (e.g., through GPS receivers or manual configuration). Other sensors discover their locations based on the reference information provided by these beacon nodes. Most of the beacon-based localization schemes assume a benign environment, where all beacon nodes are supposed to provide correct reference information. However, when the sensor networks are deployed in a hostile environment, where beacon nodes can be compromised, such an assumption does not hold anymore. In this paper, we propose a general scheme to detect localization anomalies that are caused by adversaries. Our scheme is independent from the localization schemes. We formulate the problem as an anomaly intrusion detection problem, and we propose a number of ways to detect localization anomalies. We have conducted simulations to evaluate the performance of our scheme, including the false positive rates, the detection rates, and the resilience to node compromises.
AB - In wireless sensor networks (WSNs), sensors' locations play a critical role in many applications. Having a GPS receiver on every sensor node is costly. In the past, a number of location discovery (localization) schemes have been proposed. Most of these schemes share a common feature: they use some special nodes, called beacon nodes, which are assumed to know their own locations (e.g., through GPS receivers or manual configuration). Other sensors discover their locations based on the reference information provided by these beacon nodes. Most of the beacon-based localization schemes assume a benign environment, where all beacon nodes are supposed to provide correct reference information. However, when the sensor networks are deployed in a hostile environment, where beacon nodes can be compromised, such an assumption does not hold anymore. In this paper, we propose a general scheme to detect localization anomalies that are caused by adversaries. Our scheme is independent from the localization schemes. We formulate the problem as an anomaly intrusion detection problem, and we propose a number of ways to detect localization anomalies. We have conducted simulations to evaluate the performance of our scheme, including the false positive rates, the detection rates, and the resilience to node compromises.
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U2 - 10.1109/IPDPS.2005.267
DO - 10.1109/IPDPS.2005.267
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:33746313270
SN - 0769523129
SN - 0769523129
SN - 9780769523125
T3 - Proceedings - 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, IPDPS 2005
SP - 41a
BT - Proceedings - 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, IPDPS 2005
Y2 - 4 April 2005 through 8 April 2005
ER -