Abstract
A fixed agenda social choice correspondence Ψ on outcome set X maps each profile of individual preferences into a nonempty subset of X. If Ψ satisfies an analogue of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, then either the range of Ψ contains exactly two alternatives, or else there is at most one individual whose preferences have any bearing on Ψ. This is the case even if Ψ is not defined for any proper subset of X.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-11 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Theory and Decision |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1996 |
Keywords
- Fixed agenda
- Independence
- Social choice
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Decision Sciences
- Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
- General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
- Applied Psychology
- Computer Science Applications
- General Social Sciences