Independent social choice correspondences

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations


A fixed agenda social choice correspondence Ψ on outcome set X maps each profile of individual preferences into a nonempty subset of X. If Ψ satisfies an analogue of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, then either the range of Ψ contains exactly two alternatives, or else there is at most one individual whose preferences have any bearing on Ψ. This is the case even if Ψ is not defined for any proper subset of X.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-11
Number of pages11
JournalTheory and Decision
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1996


  • Fixed agenda
  • Independence
  • Social choice

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Decision Sciences
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
  • Applied Psychology
  • Computer Science Applications
  • General Social Sciences


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