Incompatibility of strategy-proofness and the Condorcet principle

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

For social choice rules that can select either one or two alternatives, strategy-proofness is incompatible with a weak Condorcet principle.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)583-592
Number of pages10
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume15
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1998

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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