Impact of false data injection attacks on PMU-based state estimation

Sagnik Basumallik; Sara Eftekharnejad; Nathan Davis; Brian K. Johnson

doi:10.1109/NAPS.2017.8107314

Impact of false data injection attacks on PMU-based state estimation

Sagnik Basumallik, Sara Eftekharnejad, Nathan Davis, Brian K. Johnson

Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

Reliable operation of smart power grids depends on situational awareness made possible by real time system monitoring and accurate system condition estimation. Unfortunately, the tools used for real time system monitoring, which include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and phasor measurement units (PMU), are vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to the necessity of network connectivity. In this paper, the primary focus is given to the kind of cyber-attack in which a malicious entity injects false data into the power system which replaces or augments measurement data. We aim to study the impact of these false data injection attacks on PMU devices to determine and estimate the risks they represent. Two different scenarios are investigated, with and without redundancy of PMU measurements. Potential operator actions after a combined cyber-physical attack on the grid are also studied.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2017 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2017
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)	9781538626993
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/NAPS.2017.8107314
State	Published - Nov 13 2017
Event	2017 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2017 - Morgantown, United States Duration: Sep 17 2017 → Sep 19 2017

Other

Other	2017 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2017
Country	United States
City	Morgantown
Period	9/17/17 → 9/19/17

Keywords

False data injection
Phasor measurement units
State Estimation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Networks and Communications
Energy Engineering and Power Technology
Control and Optimization
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/NAPS.2017.8107314

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Cite this

Basumallik, S, Eftekharnejad, S, Davis, N & Johnson, BK 2017, Impact of false data injection attacks on PMU-based state estimation. in 2017 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2017., 8107314, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2017, Morgantown, United States, 9/17/17. https://doi.org/10.1109/NAPS.2017.8107314

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abstract = "Reliable operation of smart power grids depends on situational awareness made possible by real time system monitoring and accurate system condition estimation. Unfortunately, the tools used for real time system monitoring, which include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and phasor measurement units (PMU), are vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to the necessity of network connectivity. In this paper, the primary focus is given to the kind of cyber-attack in which a malicious entity injects false data into the power system which replaces or augments measurement data. We aim to study the impact of these false data injection attacks on PMU devices to determine and estimate the risks they represent. Two different scenarios are investigated, with and without redundancy of PMU measurements. Potential operator actions after a combined cyber-physical attack on the grid are also studied.",

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N2 - Reliable operation of smart power grids depends on situational awareness made possible by real time system monitoring and accurate system condition estimation. Unfortunately, the tools used for real time system monitoring, which include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and phasor measurement units (PMU), are vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to the necessity of network connectivity. In this paper, the primary focus is given to the kind of cyber-attack in which a malicious entity injects false data into the power system which replaces or augments measurement data. We aim to study the impact of these false data injection attacks on PMU devices to determine and estimate the risks they represent. Two different scenarios are investigated, with and without redundancy of PMU measurements. Potential operator actions after a combined cyber-physical attack on the grid are also studied.

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