TY - GEN
T1 - Impact of false data injection attacks on PMU-based state estimation
AU - Basumallik, Sagnik
AU - Eftekharnejad, Sara
AU - Davis, Nathan
AU - Johnson, Brian K.
N1 - Funding Information:
VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This work is supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) Grant No. 1600058.
Funding Information:
This work is supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) Grant No. 1600058.
PY - 2017/11/13
Y1 - 2017/11/13
N2 - Reliable operation of smart power grids depends on situational awareness made possible by real time system monitoring and accurate system condition estimation. Unfortunately, the tools used for real time system monitoring, which include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and phasor measurement units (PMU), are vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to the necessity of network connectivity. In this paper, the primary focus is given to the kind of cyber-attack in which a malicious entity injects false data into the power system which replaces or augments measurement data. We aim to study the impact of these false data injection attacks on PMU devices to determine and estimate the risks they represent. Two different scenarios are investigated, with and without redundancy of PMU measurements. Potential operator actions after a combined cyber-physical attack on the grid are also studied.
AB - Reliable operation of smart power grids depends on situational awareness made possible by real time system monitoring and accurate system condition estimation. Unfortunately, the tools used for real time system monitoring, which include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and phasor measurement units (PMU), are vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to the necessity of network connectivity. In this paper, the primary focus is given to the kind of cyber-attack in which a malicious entity injects false data into the power system which replaces or augments measurement data. We aim to study the impact of these false data injection attacks on PMU devices to determine and estimate the risks they represent. Two different scenarios are investigated, with and without redundancy of PMU measurements. Potential operator actions after a combined cyber-physical attack on the grid are also studied.
KW - False data injection
KW - Phasor measurement units
KW - State Estimation
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U2 - 10.1109/NAPS.2017.8107314
DO - 10.1109/NAPS.2017.8107314
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85040579337
T3 - 2017 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2017
BT - 2017 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2017
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2017 North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2017
Y2 - 17 September 2017 through 19 September 2017
ER -