TY - JOUR
T1 - Hedonic equilibria in housing markets
T2 - The case of one-to-one matching
AU - Yinger, John
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2015/9/1
Y1 - 2015/9/1
N2 - Neighborhood amenities, including public services, vary across locations, and a well-known theorem says that households with a higher marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for an amenity sort into locations where the amenity is better. A higher MWTP is equivalent to a steeper bid function for the amenity, and the housing price function, which is the envelope of the household bid functions, reflects this sorting process. This paper derives equilibrium expressions for the amenity level as a function of a household's relative MWTP under the assumption of one-to-one matching between household classes and amenity levels.
AB - Neighborhood amenities, including public services, vary across locations, and a well-known theorem says that households with a higher marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for an amenity sort into locations where the amenity is better. A higher MWTP is equivalent to a steeper bid function for the amenity, and the housing price function, which is the envelope of the household bid functions, reflects this sorting process. This paper derives equilibrium expressions for the amenity level as a function of a household's relative MWTP under the assumption of one-to-one matching between household classes and amenity levels.
KW - Hedonics
KW - Household sorting
KW - Neighborhood amenities
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jhe.2015.05.001
DO - 10.1016/j.jhe.2015.05.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84930206921
SN - 1051-1377
VL - 29
SP - 1
EP - 11
JO - Journal of Housing Economics
JF - Journal of Housing Economics
ER -