Force and federalism: Controlling coercion in federal hybrid regimes

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

Studies of federalism ascribe a central role to coercion in the birth and death of federations. In contrast, the role of force almost completely disappears when the focus shifts to the management of federations. However, in conditions faced by many federal hybrid regimes, the institutions said to manage federal relations - political parties, constitutions, and judiciaries - often are too weak to fulfill this role successfully. Thus, control over coercion may play an important role in resolving center-subunit disputes. Securing control over coercive power has been a prominent feature of federal relations in postSoviet Russia. Despite the weakness of coercion as a mechanism of regulating the federal bargain, certain modes of organizing force may assist federal stabilization, at least until parties and courts develop a stronger capacity to play this role.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)421-440+501-502
JournalComparative Politics
Volume39
Issue number4
StatePublished - Jul 1 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

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