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First, do no harm: Designing tax incentives for health insurance
Leonard E. Burman
, Amelia Gruber
Research output
:
Contribution to journal
›
Article
›
peer-review
2
Scopus citations
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Dive into the research topics of 'First, do no harm: Designing tax incentives for health insurance'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Keyphrases
Health Insurance
100%
Tax Credits
100%
Tax Incentives
100%
First Do No Harm
100%
Insurance
66%
Non-elderly
66%
Health Insurance Coverage
66%
Survey Data
33%
Public Policy
33%
Current Population Survey
33%
Policy Initiatives
33%
Credit Option
33%
General Insurance
33%
Health Insurance Market
33%
Doing Harm
33%
Employer-sponsored Health Insurance
33%
Social Sciences
Social Security
100%
Tax Credit
100%
Tax Relief
100%
Do-No-Harm
100%
Health Insurance Coverage
66%
Survey Analysis
33%
Government Policy
33%
Taxation
33%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Tax Incentive
100%
Health Insurance
100%
Health Insurance Coverage
66%
Insurance Tax
33%