Externalities and the possibility of pareto- satisfactory decentralization

Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper shows that the (New)2 Welfare Economics provides interesting new ways of classifying externalities in terms of the complexity of messages required to equate equilibria and optima; and in which, at the end, it is shown that the study of externalities provides useful new insights into the (New)2 Welfare Economics by showing problems with the definition of satisfactory informationally decentralized resource allocation mechanisms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)241-251
Number of pages11
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume5
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1983

Keywords

  • Externality
  • Pareto-satisfactory mechanism
  • informational decentralization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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