Explaining Self-Defeating Foreign Policy Decisions: Interpreting Soviet Arms for Egypt in 1973 Through Process or Domestic Bargaining Models?

Richard D. Anderson, Margaret G Hermann, Charles F. Hermann

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

How should we explain why a state sometimes adopts a foreign policy in one region that interferes with its concurrent policies elsewhere? In their article in the March 1989 issue of this Review, Stewart, Hermann and Hermann proposed a three-level process model of foreign policy to explain such Soviet behavior towards Egypt in 1973. The analysis has continuing interest because it interprets the puzzling behavior as a manifestation of general problems of information processing in making foreign policy choices. Richard Anderson suggests that a two-level model of domestic bargaining better accounts for the causal sequence in Soviet-Egyptian relations and is in general more parsimonious. Margaret and Charles Hermann defend their substantive analysis and argue in any case for the complementarity of process and bargaining approaches.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)759-766
Number of pages8
JournalAmerican Political Science Review
Volume86
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1992
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

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