TY - JOUR
T1 - European colonization and the corruption of local elites
T2 - The case of chiefs in Africa
AU - Ali, Merima
AU - Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge H.
AU - Shifa, Abdulaziz B.
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank the editor and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions that have greatly improved the article. Helpful comments on earlier drafts were received from Nathan Nunn and Dozie Okoye. We also thank Rui Xu for excellent research assistance. We appreciate very constructive comments and feedback from participants at the 2019 annual conference by the Society for Institutional and Organizational Economics. The paper was prepared with financial support from the Research Council of Norway ( 302685 ). Ali acknowledges support from the TaxCapDev-network ( 263392 ), funded by the Research Council of Norway. Points of view and possible errors are entirely our responsibility.
PY - 2020/11
Y1 - 2020/11
N2 - The association between British colonial rule and lower levels of corruption is often emphasized in legal origins literature (La Porta et al., 2008). However, given the historical context of Africa, we hypothesize that Britain's system of colonial control suggests a legacy of higher corruption among local elites (chiefs). First, much of the colonial control of the local population occurred through chiefs instead of the central state. Hence, the formal legal systems introduced by the colonial powers, while mostly applicable to the central state, had limited relevance to governing much of the population. Moreover, British rule entrenched the power of chiefs and undermined their accountability to the local population. Data from nationally representative surveys on the attitudes of adult Africans from anglophone and francophone countries reveal empirical patterns consistent with this hypothesis. In anglophone countries, the level of corruption among chiefs is found to be significantly higher than in francophone countries. Chiefs in anglophone countries also command a significantly lower level of public trust. These results remain robust when including a diverse set of controls, as well as in a discontinuity analysis on observations near the borders between anglophone and francophone countries.
AB - The association between British colonial rule and lower levels of corruption is often emphasized in legal origins literature (La Porta et al., 2008). However, given the historical context of Africa, we hypothesize that Britain's system of colonial control suggests a legacy of higher corruption among local elites (chiefs). First, much of the colonial control of the local population occurred through chiefs instead of the central state. Hence, the formal legal systems introduced by the colonial powers, while mostly applicable to the central state, had limited relevance to governing much of the population. Moreover, British rule entrenched the power of chiefs and undermined their accountability to the local population. Data from nationally representative surveys on the attitudes of adult Africans from anglophone and francophone countries reveal empirical patterns consistent with this hypothesis. In anglophone countries, the level of corruption among chiefs is found to be significantly higher than in francophone countries. Chiefs in anglophone countries also command a significantly lower level of public trust. These results remain robust when including a diverse set of controls, as well as in a discontinuity analysis on observations near the borders between anglophone and francophone countries.
KW - Africa
KW - Chiefs
KW - Colonial rule
KW - Corruption
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.043
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.043
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85090403894
SN - 0167-2681
VL - 179
SP - 80
EP - 100
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
ER -