Abstract
A generalized game is a strategic situation in which agents' behavior restricts their opponents' available action choices, giving rise to interdependencies in terms of what strategy profiles remain mutually feasible. This paper proposes a novel example of a simple jointly convex generalized game in which the well-known convexity, compactness, continuity, and concavity assumptions are satisfied, but no Nash equilibrium exists. The essence of this contribution lies in answering a question left open by Banks and Duggan (2004): whether the supplemental condition of lower hemicontinuity of feasibility correspondences can be dropped from these authors' equilibrium-existence theorem. It cannot.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 327-337 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 135 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2022 |
Keywords
- Existence
- Generalized games
- Nash equilibrium
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics