Electoral competition, participation, and government responsiveness in Mexico

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87 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this article I test two competing visions about how democracy produces responsive government. Electoral theories of democracy posit that elected governments are responsive to public demands because citizens are able to sanction bad politicians and select good ones. Participatory theories attribute responsiveness to a citizenry's ability to articulate demands and pressure government through a wider range of political action. I test hypotheses derived from these two approaches, using an original dataset that combines electoral, socioeconomic, and public-financial indicators for Mexico's 2,400 municipalities, from 1989 to 2000. The data show that electoral competition has no effect on municipal government performance. But the results are consistent with the hypothesis that nonelectoral participation causes improved performance. Thus, I suggest that the quality of municipal government in Mexico depends on an engaged citizenry and cooperation between political leaders and their constituents, rather than the threat of electoral punishment. I recommend that scholars broaden the study of government responsiveness to account for participatory strategies of political influence and critically assess the claims of those who would promote elections as a cure-all for poor democratic performance.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)283-299
Number of pages17
JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
Volume51
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

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